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Helen Longino has proposed four criteria that can objectively criticize the background beliefs and 
assumptions in the development of scientific theories. She deduces that the criteria - ‘recognized avenues 
for criticism,’ ‘shared standards,’ ‘community response’ and ‘equality of intellectual authority’ - are 
mutually dependent. Using the assumption that the acceptance of more than one scientific approach is 
possible only if an individual is educated in a non-standard background, and is given intellectual 
authority which, in turn, refutes the idea of standardization in science, I argue that her assertion is 
contradictory. One of her criterion ‘shared standards’ implicitly nullifies the attempt to embrace points of 
view from various other perspectives, based on the difference of cultures and intellectual backgrounds - 







Helen Longino, in her essay, “Values and Objectivity,” (1990) asserts four criteria that 
can objectively criticize the background beliefs and assumptions in the development of 
scientific theories. She maintains that science is a social process, since, scientists are 
not independent of personal values and beliefs; moreover, they depend on one another 
in this enterprise. Also, the scientific community is dependent on society for value-
judgments and economic benefits. It may be argued that some disciplines in science are 
independent of contextual values. Nevertheless, considering the scope of this paper, the 
disciplines this paper are concerned with, constitute value-judgments. To attribute 
objectivity to science, Longino asserts, is to “claim that the view provided by science is 
one achieved by reliance upon non-arbitrary and non-subjective criteria for developing, 
accepting and rejecting hypothesis and theories that make up the view.”1 As such, in the 
                                                          
1 Helen Longino, “Values and Objectivity”, Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity 
in Scientific Inquiry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 62 
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essay, Longino offers a procedural account of objectivity2—a social criticism that is 
vital in recognizing the parameters of assumptions.  
 
She argues that the scientific community is objective if “it realizes certain fair and 
objective procedures. Communities that meet her criteria [are] more likely to produce 
reliable, less distorted, or more accurate knowledge about the world.”3 Nevertheless, 
Longino’s criterion of “shared standards” in the scientific community is inconsistent 
with her notion of “equality of intellectual authority.” 
 
Longino’s Four Criteria 
 
Helen Longino asserts four criteria in science education and policy development to 
overcome bias in science. Her claim concerns that from a contextualist perspective, 
science and objectivity are mutually inclusive, however, science can adapt to the notion 
of contextual bias with regard to scientists. These criteria are the ‘recognized avenues 
for criticism’, ‘shared standards’, ‘community response’ and ‘equality of intellectual 
authority’. The first criterion is concerned with peer review and possibility of 
increasing and improving the scientific method by critical thoughts on a theory by 
individuals with expertise in the discipline. Such involvements of members pertaining 
to scientific collaboration may require the standardization of the sciences. Longino 
recognizes the setting standards in science may require the consent of the individuals 
involved in the scientific enterprise. As such, the next criterion of her argument is the 
availability and development of “shared standards” in the scientific community.  Also, 
the inclusion of community members at large implicitly explores her urge to 
democratize science. Science is a social process and as such, the most rational way to 
progress in science is to heed to the values and involvement of the community members 
who are funding scientific research.4 
 
                                                          
2 Objectivity in science is defined as a state where knowledge that is the result of science is true 
irrespective of opinions, beliefs and ideas. If a theory in any branch of science claims absolute 
objectivity, the theory must be true irrespective of any auxiliary hypotheses and personal 
prejudice of the collaborating scientists. However, absolute objectivity in scientific theories is 
often nullified by the problem of induction, and underdetermination, among other, which affirm 
that our biases are intrinsically related to our epistemic limits in the pursuit of knowledge. As 
such, for the rest of this paper, the aforementioned assumption of objectivity shall be held in 
science shall be held. 
 
3 Kristen Intemann, “Intemann Comments for Nandi,” Seminar: Objectivity and Bias in Science 
Peer Review, Montana State University Bozeman, 2013. 
 
4 Here, I must clarify that Longino is not arguing for the scrapping of pure science research, and 
she understands that pure science research often can be prone to more objectivity. 
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However, especially concerning the sciences that are value laden, she recognizes the 
importance of values in the sciences. Also the funding required for value laden research 
calls for more involvement of the community in order to heed to the values of science. 
Such a concern also leads to her last notion of ‘equality of intellectual authority.’ The 
idea of dispensing equal authority to members from different communities of science, is 
intended to help and perhaps bring in more perspectives to the scientific community. It 
is important to state Longino’s reasons for such an endeavor. She is working toward a 
hypothesis, and she expects the scientists to be objective such that science should have 
regard for the values from every community, and that no one value by a certain group 
of individuals may have precedence over any other kinds of value. One instance that 
may highlight her disposition is the craniology research in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century. The new enhancement in the social ideas of statistics and 
introduction of reductionist ideas in the sciences led to the involvement of some of the 
prominent scientists of the era to get involved in the research of the measurement of the 
skull and its interpretations. Craniologists, among others, measured the different parts 
of the skulls of men and women of European descent and African descent. The 
measurements were inherently mathematical, and the statistical data and interpretation 
were unbiased. There indeed seem to be a difference in the length and the width of the 
skulls and the portion of the skulls between these people belonging to different genders 
and races. Was this study unbiased? Certainly. To anyone who adhered to the 
objectivity of numerical systems and Euclid’s arithmetic, the measurements were 
empirical and in no way refutable. Nevertheless, the study is invalid and 
unquestionably fallacious with regard to their values. The inherent intention of the 
study was to prove the inferiority of the individuals belonging to African descent and as 
such was biased and erroneous. Now, let us analyze the study. The notion of the 
inherent differences between the two races was axiomatic for the group of scientists 
who collaborated in the investigation. Were the scientists intentionally subverting data 
to reach a conclusion that was unscientific? As stated above, the method was scientific. 
However, the inferences that they drew upon were heavily biased. They followed 
Longino’s first three criteria. They critically examined one another’s results. The 
scientists shared a certain standard among themselves, they believed in the statistical 
analysis of the skull measurements, and they were succinct in their measurements of the 
parts of the skulls. Furthermore, they adhered to the values of the then scientific 
community, which comprised of the men of European descent. But, the study is still 
erroneous and fallacious owing to the absence of the fourth criterion. The lack of the 
fourth criterion implied that intellectual authority was not necessary to be given to the 
African community and that the scientific study could be accomplished unbiasedly 
without their involvement. Longino’s fourth category, “the equality of intellectual 
authority” thus has significant implications that have historically given rise to false 
hypothesis and, as a result, to pseudoscience. As such, to continue in Longino’s causal 
path, the four criteria are mutually dependent. 
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Such an assertion upon scrutiny, nevertheless, seems contradictory to one of her 
criterion ‘equality of intellectual authority’ in the scientific community. Her ‘shared 
standards’ implicitly nullifies the attempt to embrace points of view from various other 
perspectives, based on difference of cultures and intellectual backgrounds. The 
acceptance of more than one epistemology is possible only if an individual is educated 
in a non-standard background, and is given intellectual authority which, however, 
explicitly refutes the idea of standardization in science. Shared standards in science is 
inevitable to avoid the problem of infinite recurrence of axioms and assumptions.5 
Longino’s criterion concerning Equality of Intellectual Authority, since, “some 
assumptions are not perceived as such by any members of the community,”6 contradicts 
her assertion of values for shared scientific standards. In the next section, the paper 
claims that ‘shared standards’ and ‘equality of intellectual authority’ are mutually 
inconsistent and the latter may be integrated in science, only if the individuals 
concerned with intellectual authority are educated in a environment that shares a 
scientific standard. 
 
Conflicts and Contradictions 
 
The notion of shared standards is concerned about the presence of shared characteristics 
of the scientific method, with an intention to supply enough and possible criticism. 
Furthermore, the idea of equality of intellectual authority claims that the members of 
the larger human community should be engaged in the proceeding of the scientific 
community. As such, a person may not be excluded from the scientific community 
owing to their geographical location or predisposed beliefs. There belies a significant 
dichotomy within Helen Longino’s criteria for the intended objectivity in science.  
 
Shared standards in the present scientific community underscores the extended period 
of scientific investigation in an approved university system where individuals are 
indoctrinated into the scientific method, and other disciplines through the pursuit of 
standard notions and hypothesis of science. Let us imagine a university system where 
every student goes through rigorous academic instruction in certain standard set by the 
international body of say, physicists. These standard notions imply that the 
undergraduate education received by contemporary physicists matches the education 
presently being received by the contemporary undergrads. Longino’s fourth criterion 
                                                          
5 Longino in “Values and Objectivity” (1990) writes, “if scientific inquiry is to have any effect 
on a society’s ability to take advantage of natural processes for the improvement of the quality of 
its life, criticism of assumptions cannot go on indefinitely. From a logical point of view, of 
course, criticism of background assumptions, as of any general claim, can go on ad infinitum.” 
[157] 
 
6 Helen Longino, “Values and Objectivity”, Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity 
in Scientific Inquiry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 62 
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results in the acceptance of student from all genders, races, and belief systems into the 
undergraduate program in physics. Present universities follow the non-discrimination of 
the students based on gender, birth, race, and economic resources. Moreover, the 
undergraduate education received by the students in the United States will be 
equivalent to the undergraduate education in physics in Zimbabwe. As such, Longino’s 
criteria are successful in removing geographical biases that occur in the scientific 
enterprise. Also, there are numerous examples that her criteria for objectivity avoid the 
gender biases by including her equality of intellectual authority in the shared standards 
of the scientific community. However, the criterion fails to address the ideological bias. 
 
I shall address this issue from both directions. I shall assume that shared standardization 
of science is inevitable and prove that in a world of shared standards, equality of 
intellectual authority may not be achieved. Subsequently, I shall argue that given 
equality of intellectual authority, the concept of shared standards is reduced by an 
extent that may not allow science to work. As such, the paper comes to a compromise 
between that equality of intellectual authority and shared standards which allows 
science to accept intellectuals and ideas from the all genders, races and classes while 
avoiding fallacious and erroneous science. 
 
Let us imagine a scenario where the scientific community sets standards for the 
practice of science. In other words, certain approaches in the pursuit of knowledge are 
to be called science, whereas the others are to be deemed pseudoscientific. If we 
explore the previous instance of teaching physics, the physics courses in universities 
across the world adhere to accepted theories of physics. Even the theories which are 
not proven have a standard value, achieving which a theory is deemed teachable. It 
respects the fourth criterion to the extent that the universities have a non-
discriminating admissions policy, that accepts students from all genders, races and 
classes. These students have different presupposed assumptions as they enter the 
university system. However, once they enroll in the program, they are compelled to 
give up their previously held beliefs. For instance, suppose a freshman held a 
traditional belief in the ethereal theory of light, which was never disproved by 
physics. However, the standards set by the scientific community refute the ethereal 
theory of light for a theory concerning the quantum of light. The ethereal theory was 
never explored after Hendrik Lorentz and as such has never been disproved. 
Philosophically, no school of thought can disprove the ethereal theorem of light. 
However, every experiment after the establishment of quantum mechanics have 
resulted in the acceptance of light as a quantum and implied the apparent 
insignificance of the ethereal theory. As such, though the student is not scientifically 
incorrect in hypothesizing her universe with the ethereal theory of light, the shared 
standards imply that her hypothesis stands refuted by the scientific community. Such 
an instance underscores the inconsistency of the ‘equality of intellectual authority’ 
and the shared standards of the scientific community. Let us observe a similar 
historical event concerning the refutation of a valid scientific hypothesis.  
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In the seventeenth century, the Dutch physicist, Christian Huygens proposed the wave 
theory of light, according to which light travelled in waves and was analogous to 
mathematical periodic waves. However, contemporary to Huygens was the British born 
Isaac Newton who propounded the corpuscular theory of light, according to which light 
was composed of particles. The contemporary scientific community had a shared 
standard which accepted the Newtonian theory and refuted Huygens’ theory of light as 
a wave. Moreover, any argument to compromise both was impossible -- matter could 
never be both a particle and a wave. Hence with such an assumption, shared standard 
failed to equate the intellectual authority of the well-known Newton and the little 
known Huygens. Even with Longino’s other characteristics, peer review and the 
community involvement too had to side with one of the two theory, and the corpuscular 
theory of light was one of the reasonable ones. However, history has witnessed the lack 
of development of the wave theory of light till the early nineteenth century. As such, 
the notion of shared standards in the acceptance of scientific theories refutes the 
equality of intellectual authority. Even if the scientific community accepts individuals 
from everyone in the community, it can never accept hypotheses from apparently 
unscientific origins. Therefore, the shared standards of science provide equal authority 
to individuals and hypotheses which are indoctrinated in the “shared standards.” 
Outsiders7 can have no acceptance rate in the scientific community. As such, outsiders 
cannot receive equal authority and thus, Longino’s criterion of “equality of intellectual 
authority” in science is contradicted by any standard shared over time. 
 
The second proposition is the hypothesis that if intellectual authority is granted equally 
among the members of the human species, shared standards of science will be reduced 
to an extent that science cannot work beyond the basic assumptions of mathematics and 
reason. An instance based on an ongoing issue in public schools in the United States is 
the teaching of creationism in science classes. Creationism is based on a belief system 
about the origin of life aided by an intelligent agent. It involves the presence of an 
authoritative deity to begin the formation of unicellular organisms from the organic 
molecules on an early Earth. In the late nineteenth century, however, the English 
naturalist Charles Darwin, successfully theorized his theory of evolution through 
natural selection, where the origin of life is attributed to the random selection, based on 
environment and instincts. Owing to faith and other unfalsifiable reasons, some experts 
in evolutionary biology, nevertheless, believe in creationism. Here, Longino’s ideas 
have intriguing implications. A preference toward equality of intellectual authority 
would imply that the experts who incline more on their personal and community values 
would possess the opportunity to propose the teaching of creationism, as a plausible 
theory, in public schools, whereas a preference toward “shared standards” would imply 
                                                          
7 Here, I define an outsider as any individual who adheres to hypotheses and theories 
unfalsifiable by Kuhnian notions. 
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the adherence to a falsifiable and Kuhnian scientific theory, which has successfully 
overcome 150 years of peer review. 
 
Despite Longino’s proposal for an objective scientific community, the two 
aforementioned criteria must conflict at some point. Her reason to provide for the 
equality of intellectual authority was to ensure that scientific advancement must not 
suffer due to the scientist’s gender or race. Nevertheless, I argue that her intent for 
equality of intellectual authority can be achieved even by sanctioning more power to 
her first criterion, recognized venues for criticism, and repealing the criterion of 




This paper has assumed Helen Longino’s notion of objectivity, where reliance on 
science is achieved by non-arbitrary and non-subjective criteria for the development of 
scientific theories.8 She provides the four criteria in her essay -- the “recognized 
avenues for criticism”, “shared standards”, “community response” and “equality of 
intellectual authority.” One reason Longino lays down these criteria is “to distinguish 
between objectivity as a characteristic of scientific method and objectivity as a 
characteristic of individual scientific practitioners.”9 Despite arguing for the potency of 
all four criteria, I have reasoned that her “shared standards” and “equality of intellectual 
authority” are incompatible. Furthermore, it may be argued, using the aforementioned 
instances of teaching creationism, that shared standards is paramount to the 
development of science. The equality of intellectual authority provides for the non-
discrimination on the basis of gender and race, and a commitment to diverse values and 
interests.10 However, the equality argument also provides for the diversity of beliefs, 
which may be used to refer to arguments of the creationist. I believe that diversity with 
regard to gender, race and nationality can be preserved and encouraged using more 
double-blinded approaches used in peer review and other forms of criticism in the 
scientific community. But scientific standards once set may not be altered for mere 
equality of intellectual authority, especially considering the diversity of beliefs. Lastly, 
I would assert that science is mere a tool for knowledge. It does not recognize authority 
of arguments or individual beliefs. Science, according to Longino’s visions, would 
result in an egalitarian scientific community. However, it can be more effective if we 
empower her criterion for “recognized avenues for criticism,” by providing for 
unbiased peer review, implementing strict affirmative action policies concerning gender 
                                                          
8 Helen Longino, “Values and Objectivity”, Science as Social Knowledge: Values and Objectivity 




10 Kristen Intemann, “Intemann Comments for Nandi,” Seminar: Objectivity and Bias in Science 
Peer Review, Montana State University Bozeman, 2013. 
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throughout the scientific community and necessitating equal participation of both 
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